

## July 2022 Georgia Bar Examination Essay and MPT Questions

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### ESSAY QUESTION I

Jack and Sue needed money. Both had purchased drugs from dealer Don in the past and knew Don kept large amounts of cash at his home. After talking it over, Jack and Sue decided to break into Don's house while he was out of town and take some of his money.

Jack purchased a .38 caliber handgun to take with him to Don's home. Jack used the butt of the gun to break a window to allow Jack and Sue to enter Don's home one night while Don was out of town. Unbeknownst to them, Don's pregnant girlfriend, Val, was staying in Don's house and heard the sound of glass breaking. A neighbor also heard the noise and went to investigate with his own gun. Meanwhile, Val, who was herself a convicted felon prohibited from possessing a firearm, retrieved Don's gun and went to check the front door. At that same time, the neighbor opened the front door and, with his gun ready, came in. Val saw the gun in the man's hand, failed to recognize him in the dark, and feared for her life. She fatally shot the neighbor in the chest.

Val ran to Don's bedroom to call the police. Upon entering the bedroom, she encountered Jack and Sue, who had heard the gunshot and were trying to make a quick retreat out of the home. Jack stumbled and his gun discharged, fatally wounding both Val and her unborn child. Seeing Val's lifeless body on the floor, Jack and Sue fled the scene without ever taking Don's cash.

A few days later, the police received a tip that Jack and Sue might have been involved in the fatal incident at Don's house. The police asked a friend of Jack's to call Jack and ask Jack if he knew anything about the matter. The friend made the call and recorded the conversation in which Jack said he went to Don's house to steal money but never intended for anyone to get hurt.

Provide brief responses to the following questions:

1. In no more than one sentence, state the crime that Jack and Sue were planning.

2. In no more than one sentence, state what crime (if any) Jack and Sue committed under Georgia Law when they discussed what they intended to do at Don's home.
3. What effect did Jack's purchasing of a gun have on the charges that could be brought against him for planning a crime? Explain your answer in no more than one paragraph.
4. Assume that, at trial, Sue is found not guilty of all charges. What effect, if any, would that have on the charges that could be brought against Jack? Explain your answer in no more than one paragraph.
5. If Don's girlfriend, Val, had survived, what crime, if any, could she be charged with for shooting the neighbor? What defenses might be available to her? Explain your answers in no more than two paragraphs.
6. In no more than one sentence, state what crime or crimes Jack and/or Sue committed in connection with the shooting of Val. In no more than one additional sentence, state what crime or crimes Jack and/or Sue committed in connection with Val's shooting of the neighbor.
7. Could Jack and/or Sue be charged with the crime they were actually planning? Explain your answer in no more than one paragraph.
8. Was the taped phone conversation of Jack's call from his friend admissible evidence? Explain your answer in no more than one paragraph.

## ESSAY QUESTION II

Jane has asked you for advice about a potential claim for legal malpractice against Torts-R-Us, LLP (“Firm”) or Ed Smith, a lawyer in Firm’s Los Angeles office. Firm is headquartered in Atlanta and was formed under Georgia law governing LLPs. Firm advertises nationally about its prowess in recovering for wrongful death and serious personal injuries and has offices nationwide. Ed is not a partner at Firm, but he is affiliated with it in a manner that permits him to be identified as practicing with Firm’s Los Angeles office.

Six years ago, Jane and her late husband Tim visited California on their honeymoon. They had recently graduated from college at age 22, and they were not yet on the payroll of the companies for which they planned to work after their honeymoon. Their vacation had a tragic ending when a drunken Hollywood star ran a red light and hit them as they were crossing a street in Los Angeles. Tim died from his injuries two weeks later. Jane suffered major injuries and spent several months in the hospital in California before she was able to return to Atlanta.

The financial burden faced by Jane made her anxious to pursue claims against the drunken star in hopes of an early settlement. Tim had no life insurance, and neither he nor Jane had much health insurance. Jane had seen Firm’s advertising and decided to contact its Los Angeles office. Ed, an experienced torts lawyer admitted to practice in California (but not in Georgia), met Jane in her hospital room and discussed the claims she could raise. Jane signed Firm’s standard contingency fee agreement, with Ed designated as lead counsel. The agreement did not specify any jurisdiction’s law as governing the parties’ relationship. Ed promptly prepared and filed an appropriate complaint.

The star’s lawyers made a settlement offer that was increased after further negotiations until an agreement was reached to settle for \$20 million. The settlement agreement made no allocation between the wrongful death claims for Tim and Jane’s individual claims, nor did it allocate among the different types of damages sought in the complaint (e.g., pain and suffering, medical expenses, funeral expenses, punitive damages, etc.). The agreement provided only that \$15 million be paid to Jane and \$5 million to Firm to satisfy its contingency fee. The settlement agreement was expressly governed by California law.

When Ed delivered the settlement check to Jane in her hospital room, he told her that she would not have to pay any taxes on her settlement. She told him that she intended to pay all the medical bills for the care she and Tim had received and the still unpaid expenses from his funeral and to put aside something to cover the

next few months of her medical bills. Because that still left a substantial amount, Jane wanted Ed's advice about low-risk investments she could make with the money to generate income. He then told her about a tax shelter plan that he said had been vetted by Firm's "tax guru" in Los Angeles (a lawyer also admitted only in California) for its ability to generate deductions that would legally shelter gains from any federal taxes. Jane relied on this advice and soon thereafter put most of the remaining settlement funds into this investment. She wrote Ed in February 2017, thanking him for all that he and Firm had done while representing her.

When Jane filed her federal tax return for 2016, she had reported the settlement amount in a nontaxable income category as Ed had assured her was proper. In the following years, as she received income from the investment, she claimed in her tax returns the plan's deductions that were supposed to legally shelter the income from taxation. However, her 2020 tax return was audited in 2021, and the IRS reviewed her prior years' returns beginning with 2016. She has now been notified that the IRS is questioning whether some, if not all, of the 2016 settlement amount is taxable, and it is disallowing all deductions for the tax shelter and imposing penalties. The IRS agent told her that the tax shelter plan was clearly illegal, and he commented that no experienced personal injury lawyer should have let his client sign a settlement agreement like hers, with no allocation between causes of action and types of damages.

Assume you are now assessing whether Jane has a viable malpractice claim in Georgia, and answer the following questions:

1. Will Georgia law or California law govern the substantive elements of a claim for legal malpractice that you might file in Georgia? Explain your answer.
2. Will a Georgia court have personal jurisdiction over Ed if suit is brought against both Firm and Ed individually? Explain your answer.
3. If California law governs the substantive elements of the malpractice claim, would a court hearing Jane's claims in Georgia be required to apply California's statute of limitations, which requires the plaintiff to bring suit within one year of the ending of the attorney-client relationship and does not provide for any discovery or tolling extension of that period? Explain your answer.
4. If Georgia's statute of limitations governs a legal malpractice claim that Jane might bring in a Georgia court, are her claims timely or time-barred? Explain your answer.

### ESSAY QUESTION III

Your law firm represents Highway Construction Company (“HCC”), a major highway contractor here in Georgia. HCC received a demand letter and draft complaint related to one of its highway projects. The demand is being made by Sal’s Paving Contractors, a small to mid-size contracting company (“Sal’s”). HCC has asked your firm to provide it with a preliminary analysis and assessment of Sal’s claims. Please prepare a memo to your law partner that addresses the questions below.

Last year, the Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT”) issued two highway paving replacement contracts on a 20-mile highway segment in Fulton County (the “Project”). The Project was put up for bid as two separate contracts for ten miles each. Bidding contractors could submit bids for either or both of the ten-mile segments, and both segments were subject to a common set of GDOT General Conditions. Bidding contractors were told that the contracts were related and that both segments had to be completed by the same established date.

HCC submitted a bid proposal for one of the ten-mile segments and a separate bid proposal for the two segments combined. HCC was awarded the first single ten-mile segment. Sal’s was awarded the second ten-mile segment.

HCC completed its segment on time, but Sal’s did not. GDOT declared Sal’s to be in default on the Project for this failure. After the default, GDOT put the defaulted segment back out for a bid, and HCC was the only bidder to compete for the defaulted segment. Sal’s now asserts that HCC was responsible for Sal’s failure to timely complete its segment of the Project. Sal’s asserts that HCC intentionally blocked and limited Sal’s access to its work area so that it could not complete its work on time. Sal’s also asserts that HCC made false statements to GDOT concerning the quality of Sal’s performance.

HCC has told you that from time to time in the normal course of working on its segment, its materials and equipment limited Sal’s access to Sal’s work area. HCC has also told you that on one occasion, one of its superintendents passed on to GDOT incorrect information about the quality of Sal’s performance. HCC’s representative got the information from one of Sal’s supervisors but did not confirm it for accuracy before passing it on to GDOT. Sal’s claims this conduct was intentional or reckless by HCC and constitutes tortious interference with its contract and business relations with GDOT. Sal’s claims that HCC’s conduct is the reason that GDOT declared it to be in default.

1. What is a claim of tortious interference with contract, and what elements must be proved to sustain such a claim?
2. Do the facts asserted here, if true, give Sal's a basis to establish each element of its claim of tortious interference? Explain your answer.
3. What defenses are available to HCC? Explain your answer.

## ESSAY QUESTION IV

Couple A planned to get married on April 9. They expected 200 guests, and they hired a mostly unknown local Band to play at the reception from 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. The reception was to be held at the Hotel in Ballroom One. The valid and enforceable written contract between Couple A and the Band required Couple A to pay the Band a fee of \$2,500 within three business days after the reception. However, two weeks before the wedding, Couple A split up and called off the wedding.

Hotel management told Couple A about Couple B, who were also planning to get married on April 9. Couple B had also expected 200 guests, and their reception was planned for Ballroom Two at the Hotel, which is identical in size and set-up to Ballroom One. Couple B had already hired a famous DJ to play music during their reception, also from 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. The valid and enforceable written contract required Couple B to pay DJ a fee of \$10,000 within three days after the reception. Unfortunately, however, DJ had just notified Couple B that she had been asked to play in Dubai on April 9 for a much larger fee, and she was no longer willing to honor her contract with them.

Couple A offered to assign to Couple B the contract with the Band. Couple A asked for a fee of \$500 for themselves and for Couple B to pay the Band the \$2,500 fee after the reception. Couple B happily agreed and paid Couple A \$500 on the spot.

The next day, Couple B contacted DJ. They told DJ that they had hired the Band to play at the reception. Also on that same day, Couple A notified the Band that Couple B had assumed the contract from Couple A. The Band was unhappy and the lead singer declared, “You can’t change our deal without my consent. We’ll honor our commitment to play at a reception for you, but we won’t play at someone else’s reception.”

Answer all the questions below applying Georgia law as applicable. Do not discuss concepts of force majeure or statute of frauds. Assume for questions 1, 2 and 3 that the contract between Couple A and the Band is silent with respect to either party’s right to assign the contract.

1. If the Band refuses to play at Couple B’s reception, would Couple B succeed in a breach of contract claim against the Band? Explain your answer.

2. If Couple B sues DJ for breach of contract, would DJ succeed in its own breach of contract action against the Band as an intended or incidental third-party beneficiary of the Band's contract?

3. If the Band performs at Couple B's reception, and Couple B then refuses to pay the \$2,500 fee, would the Band succeed in a breach of contract claim against Couple B? Against Couple A? Explain your answer.

4. Now assume that the contract between the Band and Couple A contains the following provision: "Neither party shall have the right to assign this contract or any of their rights or obligations under this contract." There is nothing else in the contract that relates to assignment. Does the Band have a right to refuse to perform at Couple B's reception? Explain your answer.

5. Now assume that Couples A and B never learn about each other and, the contract with the Band is never assigned to Couple B. With DJ having refused to honor her contract with Couple B, they are left with no musical entertainment at their wedding reception. The contract between Couple B and DJ contains a provision titled "Liquidated Damages" that requires DJ to pay Couple B the sum of \$8,000 in the event that DJ commits a material breach of the contract. Is that provision enforceable against DJ? Why or why not?

*July 2022*  
*MPT-1*  
*Item*

*In re Marriages of Walter Hixon*

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**In re Marriages of Walter Hixon**

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**FILE**

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***Law Office of Marianne Morton***

10 Court Plaza, Suite 2000  
Franklin City, Franklin 33705

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Examinee  
**From:** Marianne Morton  
**Date:** July 26, 2022  
**Re:** Walter Hixon matter

We represent Walter Hixon in connection with complications of his marital status. Mr. Hixon married Joan Prescott in 1986 in the State of Columbia. Several years later they separated. Mr. Hixon believed that Ms. Prescott died in 2001.

In 2012, he married Frances Tucker in the State of Columbia. They purchased a house together in Columbia early in the marriage. A few years ago, Mr. Hixon moved to Franklin for a job opportunity; Ms. Tucker remained in Columbia.

Last month, Mr. Hixon learned that Joan Prescott is still alive. He has informed Ms. Tucker of that fact. He wants to divorce Ms. Prescott, end his purported marriage with Ms. Tucker, and work out shares in the residential property that he and Ms. Tucker own.

I need you to write a memorandum to me addressing the following questions:

1. Does Columbia or Franklin law govern the grounds for annulling Mr. Hixon's marriage to Ms. Tucker?
2. Must Mr. Hixon file a lawsuit to annul his second marriage, and if yes, would he be able to obtain an annulment under the applicable law?
3. If Mr. Hixon files an annulment action in Franklin, would a Franklin court have jurisdiction to annul the marriage and to dispose of the parties' property?
4. Should we advise Mr. Hixon to file in Columbia or in Franklin?

Do not prepare a separate statement of facts, but be sure to incorporate the relevant facts into your analysis and state the reasons for your conclusions and recommendation. Do not address either Mr. Hixon's ending his marriage to Ms. Prescott or the risks of criminal prosecution he may face for bigamy; another associate will research those issues.

**Transcript of Interview with Walter Hixon, July 14, 2022**

**Att'y Morton:** Thank you for coming in today, Mr. Hixon.

**Hixon:** I appreciate your making the time. I am in a real mess.

**Morton:** Tell me how I can help you.

**Hixon:** Well, to make it short, I got married twice, but I didn't divorce my first wife because I thought she had died.

**Morton:** Yes, that would be a problem. If you can, it would help to start at the beginning.

**Hixon:** All right. I married my first wife, Joan Prescott, in 1986. I was 20 years old at the time and, to be honest, I had no idea what I was doing.

**Morton:** We may need to look up records of that marriage. Were you married here in Franklin?

**Hixon:** No. We married in Sparta, Columbia.

**Morton:** Do you remember the date?

**Hixon:** Yes, June 7, 1986. We got married at City Hall.

**Morton:** What happened after that?

**Hixon:** It was clear pretty quickly that we had made a bad mistake. We just couldn't find a way to make it work. We tried for a few years, living in a rented apartment. In 1990, I just moved out and started living with a friend of mine. Then I moved several hundred miles away to Corinth, Columbia, for a job.

**Morton:** You said you rented together. Did you buy anything together? Share finances?

**Hixon:** No. We had nothing at all, both working close to minimum wage. We made ends meet and didn't get into debt.

**Morton:** So when you separated, did you have any arguments over anything?

**Hixon:** We agreed that we would each keep our own cars. That was really all we had.

**Morton:** Any children?

**Hixon:** No.

**Morton:** Were you in college? Did either of you have any student debt?

**Hixon:** No. We had both finished high school a few years before we married, but neither of us went to college.

**Morton:** Did either of you have family in Columbia?

**Hixon:** Joan did. She came from Sparta originally. My family is all from here in Franklin.

**Morton:** Okay. You say you moved away.

**Hixon:** Yes. I got a job on a construction crew based in Corinth, and they offered me another job if I would move. So I did. After that, I had no contact with Joan at all.

**Morton:** Did you think about filing for divorce?

**Hixon:** No, I didn't. I thought the marriage was over, and I didn't have any reason to think about it. Honestly, I just avoided thinking about it. And eventually, I heard that she had died.

**Morton:** Tell me about that.

**Hixon:** That was much later, I guess. Sometime in 1993, I was promoted to crew chief and decided to stay in Corinth.

**Morton:** Any relationships during that time?

**Hixon:** Nothing serious.

**Morton:** You say you heard that Joan had died? What did you hear?

**Hixon:** Well, in 2001, I ran into an old mutual friend. He told me that Joan had just died in a car accident. I was sorry to hear about it, but we had had no contact for 11 years. I just moved on.

**Morton:** All right. I understand. Tell me about your second marriage.

**Hixon:** Well, in 2011, I met Frances Tucker. We really hit it off and started going out together. Franny and I saw eye to eye on most things at that point. So I proposed. We got married in July 2012.

**Morton:** Where?

**Hixon:** We got married in Corinth, Columbia. Her mother was still alive, and Franny wanted her mother to be part of it. So we had a church wedding, the reception, the whole deal.

**Morton:** And after that?

**Hixon:** Things went well for a while. I was working up to a management position in the construction company. When I met her, Franny was training to become a radiology technician and then got a good job with a local lab. About two years after that, we bought a house together.

**Morton:** When was that?

**Hixon:** February 2015. On the outskirts of Corinth.

**Morton:** Who owned it? And did you take out a mortgage?

**Hixon:** We were both on the deed and both on the mortgage with the bank.

**Morton:** Did you share expenses?

**Hixon:** Everything went into a joint account, and we paid bills out of that.

**Morton:** Again, any children?

**Hixon:** No.

**Morton:** You gave a Franklin address when you called in. When did you move to Franklin?

**Hixon:** In 2019. My company opened an office here in Franklin City and asked me to get it started. I talked with Franny. She did not want to move, but we both knew that this would be a good opportunity for me. So we decided to live apart.

**Morton:** Did you sell the Columbia house?

**Hixon:** No, Franny still lives there. We have both continued to make payments on the mortgage.

**Morton:** What happened next?

**Hixon:** My job went really well. But the separation really took it out of both of us. Our relationship fell apart. I visited her a few times, but Franny never came here, even for a visit.

**Morton:** You said at the start that your first wife, Joan, is still alive. When did you learn that?

**Hixon:** Recently. To my shock, last month I got an email from Joan asking to talk with me by phone. When we talked, I told her that I had heard that she had died. She said that she had been in a bad accident and had almost died, but she had recovered. She said that she was thinking of getting married again and asked if I would agree to a divorce.

**Morton:** What did you do then?

**Hixon:** I didn't know what to do. I called Franny to let her know. She was upset, as you would expect. And she was clear about two things. First, that was the end for us. And second, I had to clean up the mess.

**Morton:** Just a few more questions. Do you and Franny still own the house in Columbia?

**Hixon:** Yes.

**Morton:** So, what do you want to happen?

**Hixon:** I want to figure out what I have to do about the second marriage. I want my fair share of the Columbia house. And I want to get the divorce from Joan.

**Morton:** Thank you. Your situation raises some complicated questions. We will have to do some research before we can let you know your options.

**Law Office of Marianne Morton**  
10 Court Plaza, Suite 2000  
Franklin City, Franklin 33705

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Marianne Morton  
**From:** George Dugger, investigator  
**Date:** July 19, 2022  
**Re:** Walter Hixon: marital records

At your instruction, I searched for records on the marriages of Walter Hixon.

Marriage to Joan Prescott

I contacted the Division of Vital Records in the State of Columbia and found a record of a marriage between Walter John Hixon and Joan Marie Prescott on June 7, 1986. Hixon is listed as age 20 and Prescott as age 21.

Marriage to Frances Tucker

I contacted the Division of Vital Records in the State of Columbia and found a record of a marriage between Walter John Hixon and Frances Frost Tucker on July 14, 2012. Hixon is listed as age 46 and Tucker as age 51.

**LIBRARY**

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**Excerpt from *Walker's Treatise on Domestic Relations***

**§ 1.7 *Annulment as distinguished from divorce***

In the preceding sections, we described the grounds for annulment under Franklin law. In general, parties to a divorce action must prove that the original marriage was valid and ask the court to end that marriage. By contrast, in an annulment case, at least one party asserts that the marriage was void and asks that the court declare that the marriage is void.

A person might seek an annulment for various reasons. For example: a party might want the finality of a judicial decree declaring the marriage annulled; an annulment may satisfy the tenets of a party's religious faith; an annulment may serve as documentation that a party can use for other purposes, such as survivors' benefits and taxation; and an annulment could determine issues relating to children or property.

In Franklin, an annulment action may address the same issues as those that arise in a divorce. Franklin Domestic Relations Code § 19-7 provides: "The provisions relating to property rights of the spouses, support, and custody of children on dissolution of marriage are applicable to proceedings for annulment." Thus, where the parties have children, the court in an annulment case may also address custody, visitation, and child support issues in the same way as it would in a divorce. Finally, provided it has jurisdiction, a Franklin court can issue orders dividing the property interests of the parties to an annulment, using the same rules as those governing the equitable division of property in a divorce.

**Selected Columbia and Franklin Statutes**

**Columbia Revised Statutes § 718.02 – Voidable Marriages**

A. A marriage is voidable if any of the following conditions existed at the time of the marriage:

(1) The spouse of either party was living and the marriage with that spouse was then in force and that spouse was absent and not known to the party commencing the proceeding to be living for a period of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent marriage for which the annulment decree is sought.

...

B. For a voidable marriage to be declared void, either party may seek and a court must issue an annulment decree.

**Franklin Domestic Relations Code § 19-5 – Void Marriages**

(a) The following marriages shall be void, without the need for any decree of divorce, annulment, or other legal proceeding:

(1) All marriages between parties where either party is lawfully married to another person.

...

## Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971)

### § 6 Choice-of-Law Principles

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include:

...

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

...

(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

\* \* \*

### § 283 Validity of Marriage

(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.

#### Comment to § 283

a. *Scope of section.* The rule of this Section is concerned with what law governs the validity of a marriage as such, namely with what law determines, without regard to any incident involving the marriage, whether [the parties are lawful spouses].

...

**Fletcher v. Fletcher**

Franklin Court of Appeal (2014)

This case began as an action for divorce brought in Franklin district court by the appellee, Richard Fletcher, against the appellant, Wendy Fletcher. Richard requested custody of the parties' children and an award of child support.

The trial court awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children to Wendy. The trial court also awarded her alimony and child support. To date, Richard has paid all child support owed but has paid no alimony.

Richard moved to the State of Columbia two months after the divorce. He then filed an action in that state to annul his marriage to Wendy. He alleged for the first time that the marriage had been induced by Wendy's misrepresentations about her mental health, that he had learned of her severe mental illness only after the marriage, and thus that the marriage had been induced by fraud.

Wendy contested Richard's allegations. The Columbia trial court annulled the marriage on the ground of fraudulent inducement and noted that, by filing an appearance, Wendy had waived any objection to the court's jurisdiction. Richard then told Wendy that he would not contest custody of the children and would continue to pay child support, but that he would never pay her alimony.

Wendy then filed a motion in the Franklin court to enforce the alimony order. In his reply, Richard argued that the marriage had been invalidated by a Columbia court and that the alimony order was therefore void. The trial court terminated Richard's alimony obligation after the date of the Columbia court order, while also ordering Richard to pay all alimony due before that date. Wendy appealed, contending that the Franklin trial court had erred in giving full faith and credit to the Columbia annulment decree.

On appeal, Wendy contends that the Columbia annulment should not be given full faith and credit because the Columbia court did not apply Franklin law. Wendy correctly notes that fraudulent inducement does not constitute a ground to annul a marriage under Franklin law. By contrast, the law of the State of Columbia does permit annulment on that ground.

We must thus determine which state's law the trial court should have applied. In general, Franklin law holds that the validity of a marriage should be determined by the

law of the state with the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage, and that a marriage valid where contracted is valid everywhere. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971). If a state has no such relationship, that state must apply the law of the state that does.

For example, in *Simeon v. Jaynes* (Fr. Sup. Ct. 2009), one spouse sought to use a Franklin court to annul a marriage entered into in Columbia. The plaintiff spouse alleged that the marriage was bigamous because the defendant spouse had entered the marriage knowing of a previous valid marriage that had not been the subject of an annulment or a divorce. Under Franklin law, such a marriage is void from the start, without the need for any further action. By contrast, under Columbia law, such a marriage is voidable, requiring judicial action to end it. In that case, the parties had lived together only in Columbia, owned property there, and had incurred debts there. On these grounds, the Franklin Supreme Court held that the trial court should have applied Columbia law, given the significant connections between the spouses and the State of Columbia.

The Restatement advises that a court make this decision about the existence of "the most significant relationship" using the factors stated in RESTATEMENT § 6:

—*"the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue"*: All states have legitimate policy interests in defining how a relationship as fundamental as marriage can be initiated and ended. The very fact that Columbia and Franklin recognize different reasons for annulling a marriage indicates the strength of the policy interests involved.

—*"the protection of justified expectations"*: Wendy and Richard married in Franklin, lived the entirety of their married life here, had children in Franklin, and owned property together here. Wendy and the two children continue to reside here. The only connection to the State of Columbia lies in the short time during which Richard established a residence there. These facts strongly suggest that the parties had a justified expectation that Franklin law would govern the terms on which the marriage ended.

—*"certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result"*: People often move between states, creating the need for a system of well-defined rules to govern which state's laws apply to the creation and termination of marriages.

—*"ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied"*: As noted above, all the important events in this marriage occurred in Franklin. Considerations of ease and administrative efficiency strongly suggest Franklin as the appropriate forum.

As a result, the Columbia trial court erred in not applying the law of the State of Franklin. Its failure to do so resulted in an order that improperly invalidated a marriage that was validly entered into in Franklin. A marriage that is valid in Franklin should be valid everywhere "unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage." RESTATEMENT § 283(2). Since Columbia had only a minimal relationship to this marriage, we need not consider whether the marriage violated the strong public policy of Columbia.

We thus conclude that the Franklin trial court erred in giving full faith and credit to the Columbia annulment order.

Reversed and remanded.

### Daniels v. Daniels

Franklin Court of Appeal (1997)

Elizabeth and John Daniels were married in Columbia and resided there until they separated. Mr. Daniels then moved to Franklin, purchased real property, and a year later, filed for divorce in Franklin district court. Ms. Daniels remained in Columbia and did not come to Franklin with her husband. In his complaint, Mr. Daniels requested only that he be granted a total divorce from Ms. Daniels and that the Franklin property be awarded to him.

In response, Ms. Daniels entered a special appearance solely for the purpose of challenging the court's jurisdiction. Mr. Daniels opposed that challenge. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that it had "jurisdiction over the *res* of the marriage relationship itself" and "*in rem* jurisdiction with respect to the property located within this State." We granted Ms. Daniels's application for an interlocutory appeal.

On appeal, Ms. Daniels insists that the trial court erred in ruling that it had *in personam* jurisdiction over her. But the trial court never ruled that it had *in personam* jurisdiction over Ms. Daniels. The trial court ruled only that it had jurisdiction over the *res* of the marriage so as to determine the issue of divorce. It also ruled that it had *in rem* jurisdiction over the marital property located in Franklin. If these rulings are correct, the trial court would not need to exercise *in personam* jurisdiction over Ms. Daniels herself.

*In personam* jurisdiction over both parties to the marriage is not a prerequisite to the grant of a divorce by a Franklin court. The party seeking a divorce need show only that the trial court has jurisdiction over the *res* of the marriage. A court has jurisdiction over the *res* of the marriage relationship when one of the parties to the marriage has been domiciled within the state for the requisite period, which in Franklin is six months. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "each state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent." *Williams v. North Carolina*, 317 U.S. 287, 298–99 (1942).

Ms. Daniels's reliance on the Franklin Long Arm Statute is misplaced. That statute deals only with the exercise of *in personam* jurisdiction over nonresidents. The Long Arm Statute does not apply in every case in which the defendant is a nonresident. It applies

only in cases in which *in personam* jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is required. However, Franklin case law has long held that *in personam* jurisdiction is not required to terminate the marriage relationship, whether through divorce, *Price v. Price* (Fr. Sup. Ct. 1972), or by annulment, *Carew v. Ellis* (Fr. Sup. Ct. 1957). Provided that the plaintiff has established residency in Franklin for at least six months, the trial court may exercise jurisdiction over the marriage relationship.

Ms. Daniels argues in the alternative that the presence of issues other than ending the marriage requires the trial court to have *in personam* jurisdiction over her. Ms. Daniels correctly notes that a trial court with jurisdiction to grant a divorce cannot award alimony or attorney's fees unless it has *in personam* jurisdiction. *Boyd v. Boyd* (Fr. Sup. Ct. 1977).

However, the only other issues relate to disposition of marital property located in the State of Franklin. We have long held that, even in the absence of *in personam* jurisdiction over the defendant in a case seeking to end a marriage, a Franklin court can render a valid judgment with respect to real property located in Franklin. *Gore v. Gore* (Fr. Sup. Ct. 1985) (divorce); *Carew v. Ellis, supra* (annulment). These cases hold that where division of the property is at issue, a Franklin court can exert *in rem* jurisdiction over the property in Franklin without establishing *in personam* jurisdiction over the defendant.

Finally, Ms. Daniels argues that due process requires that a Franklin court have *in personam* jurisdiction over her before it can dispose of property in which she has a marital interest, citing *Shaffer v. Heitner*, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). That case holds that assertions of jurisdiction by a state court must satisfy the "minimum contacts" standard. The Supreme Court in *Shaffer* held only that the mere presence of property in a state, standing alone, will not constitute sufficient "minimum contacts" to support the state's exercise of its *in rem* jurisdiction, *if* the property is unrelated to the underlying cause of action. However, the Court noted in dicta that, "when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant," a state court may properly exercise jurisdiction over the property. *Shaffer, supra* at 199 n. 17.

Ms. Daniels correctly notes that her only contact with this state is that her husband moved to Franklin after their separation but while they were still married. Were it not for her marriage to Mr. Daniels, a Franklin court could not exercise jurisdiction over her. But, as noted, Franklin does have jurisdiction over both the marriage and the marital property.

Because Mr. Daniels's complaint addressed the division only of property located in Franklin, the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction did not violate due process.

Affirmed.

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## MULTISTATE PERFORMANCE TEST DIRECTIONS

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Do not include your actual name anywhere in the work product required by the task memorandum.

This performance test will be graded on your responsiveness to the instructions regarding the task you are to complete, which are given to you in the first memorandum in the File, and on the content, thoroughness, and organization of your response.

*July 2022*  
*MPT-2*  
*Item*

*In re Nina Briotti*

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**In re Nina Briotti**

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**Zeller & Weiss LLP**  
Attorneys at Law  
Franklin City, Franklin 33705

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Examinee  
**From:** Howard Zeller  
**Date:** July 26, 2022  
**Re:** Briotti request for advice

Nina Briotti, an attorney and sole practitioner, has asked our firm's advice concerning a matter in which she is involved. She is concerned that a client of hers might undertake an illegal and criminal action. She asks whether she may record a telephone conversation, without the client's knowledge or approval, in which she counsels the client against that course of action.

Briotti's client "X" (whom Briotti has not identified by name) is a financial adviser whom Briotti has counseled for several years as to various transactions. X has recently faced serious setbacks in investments made on behalf of his clients. In a recent telephone conversation with Briotti, X made comments that suggested that he might use funds from a trust fund he administers to cover the losses. Briotti intends to telephone X in the near future to counsel him that it would be illegal to use the trust fund for that purpose. She would like to record that telephone conversation without informing X that she is doing so.

She asks for our advice on the following three questions:

1. Under applicable state law, may Briotti lawfully record her telephone conversation with X without informing X that she is doing so?
2. Assuming that Briotti could make such a recording lawfully under state law, would doing so without the client's knowledge violate the Rules of Professional Conduct? Please analyze the ethical considerations involved.
3. Further assuming that state law would allow Briotti to make such a recording and that doing so would not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, must she inform X that she is doing so if he asks?

Please prepare an objective memorandum to me addressing these questions, stating your analysis and conclusions. Do not include a separate statement of facts, but be sure to integrate the facts into your analysis.

## TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH NINA BRIOTTI

**Attorney Howard Zeller:** Hi, Nina, great to see you again.

**Nina Briotti:** Likewise, Howard, thanks for seeing me. I need your advice.

**Zeller:** Please explain.

**Briotti:** I have a client—I'll just call him "X"—and my continuing representation of him poses a concern. He's a financial adviser (not an attorney), with some very rich clients, and he's one of those advisers who are prone to make risky investments on behalf of their clients in the hopes of a really big payday. In the past few months, he's told me that many of his investments on behalf of his clients have not been successful—he's lost a huge amount of his clients' money, and they know it. Now many of his clients are demanding that he liquidate their accounts and remit the balances to them in cash. He has only two weeks to pay them and sounded desperate. The problem, as he's explained it, is that so many of his clients have made that demand that, if he does as they have requested, because of the nature of the investments, he could not cover the losses, would be out of business, and would suffer personal financial ruin. In our last telephone conversation, he intimated that the only place he could get enough cash quickly would be from a trust fund he administers.

As I advised him, that would be illegal, would subject him to possible criminal charges, and could seriously damage the beneficiaries of the trust because they rely on regular income from it. He didn't respond. His silence caused me concern that there's at least a possibility that he might commit a crime. I'm going to call him in a few days, to be sure he understands that he can't invade the trust. Because I'm not sure he'll accept my advice, I'd like to record that telephone call. I want to be sure that I have evidence that I properly advised him if he ignores my advice. Obviously, I don't want him to know that I'm recording the phone call. If he asks whether I'm recording the conversation, must I tell him? I need your advice on all these points.

**Zeller:** I understand. Do you have notes of your conversation with him?

**Briotti:** Yes, I've typed up my handwritten notes, taking out any confidential information that would identify X. Here they are [typed notes attached to this transcript].

**Zeller:** Let me ask you a few questions. First, we have to determine if your recording of the phone conversation without his knowledge is legal. I know that your office is here in Franklin—is X located in this state as well?

**Briotti:** No, he's located in our neighboring state of Olympia. As you know, in addition to being an expert in financial matters, I'm a member of both the Franklin and Olympia bars, and I think that's one of the reasons he retained me.

**Zeller:** Then the first question we'll have to determine is whether Franklin and Olympia require the consent of one or both parties to a phone conversation for recording it to be lawful, and then we'll need to know which state's law governs a cross-border conversation.

**Briotti:** Whatever the state law is on the subject, I'm also concerned with whether I'm allowed to record the conversation under the Rules of Professional Conduct.

**Zeller:** Exactly—that's the next issue we'll have to analyze. Both Franklin and Olympia have adopted the American Bar Association's Model Rules as their own, so we'll look at that.

**Briotti:** If I can record the conversation, may I keep that a secret from X should he ask if I'm doing so?

**Zeller:** We'll look into that as well. Let me ask you this: How certain are you that he will invade the trust he administers to get the cash?

**Briotti:** I'm not really sure. He is desperate and might do so, but then again, he knows that it would be illegal and might not do it.

**Zeller:** So how do you come out on whether he will do it or not?

**Briotti:** I think it's possible.

**Zeller:** We'll get right on it, and I'll get back to you.

**TYPED VERSION OF NINA BRIOTTI'S NOTES**

July 18, 2022

[X] calls. Tells me he has real problems. Investments for clients have tanked, and most clients are demanding immediate liquidation of accounts and cash payments. He has only two weeks to make payments. He says his investors knew the investments were risky and yet they now blame him because the investments didn't work out.

If he liquidates all accounts requested, he will be out of business, lose everything including personal wealth (possibly bankrupt?).

Doesn't know what to do. He is desperate. The only source of cash that would keep him solvent is a trust account that he administers. The trust is money left by a former client, and it pays modest monthly payments to her heirs. He says he could easily keep up with those payments to the heirs. Once he has more cash, he could pay back the money to the trust before anyone knows about it.

I tell him that invading the trust would be illegal.

He repeats that he doesn't know what to do and keeps referring to the trust he administers.

**LIBRARY**

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## FRANKLIN CRIMINAL CODE

### **§ 200 Interception and attempted interception of wire communication prohibited; exceptions.**

- (1) Except as provided in this Section, it is unlawful for any person to intercept or attempt to intercept any wire communication unless
- (a) the interception or attempted interception is made with the prior consent of one of the parties to the communication; or
  - (b) [an emergency situation exists and it is impractical to get a court order; subsequent court ratification needed].

As used in this Section, interception of a wire communication includes the recording of that communication.

## OLYMPIA CRIMINAL CODE

### **§ 500.4 Interception and attempted interception of wire communication prohibited; exceptions.**

- (1) Except as provided in this Section, it is unlawful for any person to intercept or attempt to intercept any wire communication unless
- (a) the interception or attempted interception is made with the prior consent of all the parties to the communication; or
  - (b) [an emergency situation exists and it is impractical to get a court order; subsequent court ratification needed].

As used in this Section, interception of a wire communication includes the recording of that communication.

## ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

### Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).

(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;

(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;

(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;

(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; . . .

...

### Rule 8.4: Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; . . .

**ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON  
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
[EXCERPTED, FOOTNOTES OMITTED]**

Formal Opinion 01-422, June 24, 2001

Electronic Recordings by Lawyers Without the Knowledge of All Participants

**1. Introduction**

In Formal Opinion 337 [adopted in 1974], this Committee stated that with a possible exception for conduct by law enforcement officials, a lawyer ethically may not record any conversation by electronic means without the prior knowledge of all parties to the conversation. The position taken in Opinion 337 has been criticized by a number of state and local ethics committees, and at least one commentator has questioned whether it survives adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Committee has reexamined the issue and now rejects the broad proscription stated in Opinion 337. We conclude that the mere act of secretly but lawfully recording a conversation is not inherently deceitful. . . .

**2. Reasons for Abandonment of the General Prohibition Stated in Opinion 337**

Formal Opinion 337 was decided under the [prior] Code of Professional Responsibility, which incorporated the principle that a lawyer "should avoid even the appearance of impropriety." That admonition was omitted as a basis for professional discipline nine years later in the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Opinion 337 further stated, however, that "conduct which involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in the view of the Committee clearly encompasses the making of recordings without the consent of all parties." The Model Code's prohibition against conduct involving deceit or misrepresentation was preserved in Model Rule 8.4(c), and thus we must consider whether that conclusion by the Committee in Opinion 337 is correct under the Model Rules. Reception by state and local bar committees of the principle embraced by Opinion 337 has been mixed. [Review of state responses omitted.]

Criticism of Opinion 337 has occurred in three areas. First, the belief that nonconsensual taping of conversations is inherently deceitful, embraced by this

Committee in 1974, is not universally accepted today. The overwhelming majority of states permit recording by consent of only one party to the conversation. Surreptitious recording of conversations is a widespread practice by law enforcement, private investigators, and journalists, and the courts universally accept evidence acquired by such techniques. Devices for the recording of telephone conversations on one's own phone are readily available and widely used. Thus, even though recording of a conversation without disclosure may to many people "offend a sense of honor and fair play," it is questionable whether anyone today justifiably relies on an expectation that a conversation is not being recorded by the other party, absent a special relationship with or conduct by that party inducing a belief that the conversation will not be recorded.

Second, there are circumstances in which requiring disclosure of the recording of a conversation may defeat a legitimate and even necessary activity. For that reason, even those authorities that have agreed with the basic proposition of Opinion 337 have tended to recognize numerous exceptions. [Listing of exceptions omitted.]

A degree of uncertainty is common in the application of rules of ethics, but an ethical prohibition that is qualified by so many varying exceptions and such frequent disagreement as to the viability of the rule as a basis for professional discipline is highly troubling. We think the proper approach to the question of legal but nonconsensual recordings by lawyers is not a general prohibition with certain exceptions, but a prohibition of the conduct only where it is accompanied by other circumstances that make it unethical. The third major criticism of Opinion 337 has been that whatever its basis under the Canons and the Model Code, it is not consistent with the approach of the Model Rules. The Model Rules do not contain the injunction of the Model Code that lawyers "should avoid even the appearance of impropriety." . . .

The Committee believes that to forbid obtaining of evidence by nonconsensual recordings that are lawful and consequently do not violate the legal rights of the person whose words are unknowingly recorded would be unfaithful to the Model Rules as adopted.

### **3. Nonconsensual Recording in Violation of State Law**

Federal law permits recording of a conversation by consent of one party to the conversation. Some states, however, prohibit recordings without the consent of all

parties, usually with an exception for law enforcement activities and occasionally with other exceptions. Violation of such laws is a criminal offense, and may subject the lawyer to civil liability to persons whose conversations have been recorded secretly. A lawyer who records a conversation in the practice of law in violation of such a state statute likely has violated Model Rule 8.4(b) or 8.4(c) or both. . . . A lawyer contemplating nonconsensual recording of a conversation should, therefore, take care to ensure that he is informed of the relevant law of the jurisdiction in which the recording occurs.

#### **4. False Denial that a Conversation Is Being Recorded**

That a lawyer may record a conversation with another person without that person's knowledge and consent does not mean that a lawyer may state falsely that the conversation is not being recorded.

#### **5. Undisclosed Recording of Conversations with Clients**

When a lawyer contemplates recording a conversation with a client without the client's knowledge, ethical considerations arise that are not present with respect to nonclients. Lawyers owe to clients, unlike third persons, a duty of loyalty that transcends the lawyer's convenience and interests. The duty of loyalty is in part expressed in the Model Rules requiring preservation of confidentiality and communication with a client about the matter involved in the representation. Whether the Model Rules that define and implement these duties permit a lawyer to record a client conversation without the client's knowledge is a question on which the members of this Committee are divided. The Committee is unanimous, however, in concluding that it is almost always advisable for a lawyer to inform a client that a conversation is being or may be recorded, before recording such a conversation.

Clients must assume, absent agreement to the contrary, that a lawyer will memorialize the client's communication in some fashion. But a recording that captures the client's exact words, no matter how ill-considered, slanderous, or profane, differs from a lawyer's notes or dictated memorandum of the conversation. If the recording were to fall into unfriendly hands, whether by inadvertent disclosure or by operation of

law, the damage or embarrassment to the client would likely be far greater than if the same thing were to happen to a lawyer's notes or memorandum of a client conversation.

Recordings of conversations may, of course, serve useful functions in the representation of a client. Electronic recording saves the lawyer the trouble of taking notes and ensures an accurate record of the instructions or information imparted by a client. These beneficial purposes may weigh in favor of recording conversations, but they do not require that the recording be done secretly.

The relationship of trust and confidence that clients need to have with their lawyers, and that is contemplated by the Model Rules, likely would be undermined by a client's discovery that, without his knowledge, confidential communications with his lawyer have been recorded by the lawyer. Thus, whether or not undisclosed recording of a client conversation is unethical, it is inadvisable except in circumstances where the lawyer has no reason to believe that the client might object, or where exceptional circumstances exist. Exceptional circumstances might arise if the client, by his own acts, has forfeited the right of loyalty or confidentiality. For example, there is no ethical obligation to keep confidential plans or threats by a client to commit a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. Nor is there an ethical obligation to keep confidential information necessary to establish a defense by the lawyer to charges based upon conduct in which the client is involved. Those members of the Committee who believe that the Model Rules forbid a lawyer from recording client conversations without the client's knowledge nonetheless would recognize exceptions in circumstances such as these.

## **Excerpts from the FRANKLIN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT**

**Rule 8.4** [Franklin has adopted ABA Rule 8.4.]

### **Franklin State Bar Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commentary**

Franklin has adopted ABA Formal Opinion 01-422, and it is of persuasive weight under Franklin law, as are these comments. The ABA Committee noted that it might be permissible in exceptional circumstances to record a telephone conversation with a client without the client's knowledge, including a conversation in which a client discloses a plan to commit a serious crime.

However, it may be difficult to predict whether a future conversation will meet the requirements of such an exceptional circumstance. The key question is whether such a recording will violate the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. That duty governs both the lawyer's actual behavior and the results of that behavior—the dangers of inadvertent or intentional disclosure of the client's confidences. As the Formal Opinion notes, another important danger of such recording is the breach of confidentiality that might ensue absent those exceptional circumstances. See Model Rule 1.6. In deciding whether to undertake a recording of a conversation with a client without the client's knowledge, the lawyer should take care to act on facts and well-grounded judgment, rather than speculation, as to the client's intended actions. The lawyer should consider the client's previous statements, the client's circumstances, and alternative methods of memorializing the conversation when determining the need for recording the conversation without the client's knowledge. Hence, a lawyer who undertakes such recording of a client must be fully aware of these risks and must reasonably believe in the necessity of making such a recording.

We therefore echo the ABA Committee's conclusion that recording of a conversation with a client, but without the client's knowledge, is almost always inadvisable unless the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary. Without such necessity, a recording undermines the trust and truthful dealing that is a hallmark of the attorney-client relationship.

**Shannon v. Spindrift, Inc.**  
Olympia District Court (2018)

Plaintiff Mark Shannon is a resident of Olympia, and claims that defendant Spindrift Inc., a corporation formed and operating in our neighboring state of Columbia, violated his rights by recording his telephone conversation with Spindrift's customer call center, located in Columbia, without informing him of the recording and without his consent. Shannon brought a civil action claiming that Spindrift's recording was unlawful and hence caused him damage. Spindrift, in turn, brought this motion to dismiss, arguing that, as a matter of law, the recording was lawful and hence Spindrift was not liable for any claimed damage resulting from the mere fact of the recording.

Therefore, the court is asked to decide whether the recording of the telephone conversation at issue was lawfully made.

Olympia is an "all-party consent" state, in that our statute prohibits the recording of a telephone conversation without the consent of all parties to the call. OLYMPIA CRIM. CODE (OCC) § 500.4. Columbia, on the other hand, is a "one-party consent" state, in that its statute requires only "prior consent of one of the parties to the communication" for its recording to be legal. COLUMBIA CRIM. CODE § 440.7. (Both statutes allow for civil and criminal actions to be brought if they are violated.)

Thus, the question posed is whether Olympia's statute applies to recording of a telephone conversation with a person in Olympia without that person's consent when the recording is made by a party who is located and uses recording equipment outside of Olympia.

Our courts have repeatedly concluded that, under our statute, "the recording of a telephone conversation constitutes an 'intercept' under OCC § 500.4(a), and thus that statute prohibits the recording of telephone conversations with the consent of only one party." See, e.g., *Wessel v. Sykes* (Olympia Sup. Ct. 2014).

The crux of Spindrift's argument is that OCC § 500.4 does not apply because the allegedly prohibited conduct—the interception of the telephone call—took place outside of Olympia. Shannon, on the other hand, argues that OCC § 500.4 applies because the statute contains no location-based limitations and Spindrift's actions caused harm in Olympia.

Here, *Parnell v. Brant*, a 2004 decision of the Olympia Supreme Court, is instructive. That case addressed whether a recording made in Columbia of a conversation with a person in Olympia, made without that person's consent, could be admitted as evidence in their criminal trial. The court held that "Olympia law allows the admission of evidence legally obtained in the jurisdiction seizing the evidence." The court noted that the interception "was lawful at its inception in Columbia, as Columbia requires only that one party consent in order to allow monitoring of the communication." Accordingly, our court concluded that, because the recording was permissible in Columbia, it was admissible as evidence in the Olympia criminal trial "even though the manner of interception would violate Olympia law had the interception taken place in Olympia."

While the central issue in *Parnell* concerned admissibility of evidence in a criminal case, rather than the viability of a civil action based on the act of recording itself (as is the case here), consistent with the court's analysis in *Parnell*, we hold that in civil or criminal actions, OCC § 500.4 does not apply when the act of interception takes place outside of Olympia. Instead, "interceptions and recordings occur where made." *Parnell*. Accordingly, on these facts, the recording of which plaintiff Shannon complains was lawfully made, and hence there is no basis for his civil action.

Motion to dismiss granted.

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